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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of gender dichotomy on dividend payout
policy in listed Nigerian financial services firm. A random-panel data methodological
approach underpins this study. The study observed an overall panel data of 248
firm-year observations drawn from the sample of 31 financial service firms listed in
Nigeria stock exchange between 2010–2017. The findings from the random-panel
data regression adopted for the study shows that the presence of female director-
ship does not significantly influence dividend payout in Nigeria. The rate of dividend
payout is highly determined by firm age and their performance. However, we
recommend a more diverse board structure, considering the significant effect board
size has on dividend payout policy. A more robust and diverse board will create an
atmosphere of discipline and control in the organization.
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1. Introduction
As the business environment becomes more competitive by the day, the corporate sustainability
and transparent reporting are much more in demand by stakeholders and others to the external
entity, one thing remains absolutely fundamental about the change in these corporations which is
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the acceptance of norms that is reflecting the best interest of stakeholders; women electioneering
and participating in the board composition are exclusively necessary as a substance and makes
them models and proxies for a balanced scorecard for dividend decision in the wake of corporate
governance. Globally, a new trend in corporate governance is emerging with gender diversity
gaining remarkable and exploratory dimension with organisational performance. According to
Okere et al. (2019), human behaviour is dynamic and shapes the way organisation is managed
and controlled, in pursuance of goals relative to entity’s congruence; women most likely demon-
strates a functional mutually exclusive social, economic, political, educational and legal capacity in
influencing corporate decisions. While contextualizing dividend payment and nexus of gender to
the fore of corporate economic reality, it is noteworthy that coalition of interest diversity between
managers and shareholders is equally imminent; this gap has precipitated constant exposure to
the risk of litigation which stems a threat to corporate survival, external networking and compe-
titive repositioning within the business environment.
In reality, mapping out dividend policy is mandatory for a finance manager. However, a sound
system of robust dividend disbursement to shareholders’ increases market value of equity and
helps a firm to set off cost of debt from future earnings potentials while maintaining healthy
capital structure finance, as a tentative decision, it only becomes final and conclusive subject to
board members’ ratification representing stakeholder’s interest. In the light of agency theory,
corporate managers often use prerogative powers within their jurisdiction to enrich themselves
with little or no consideration to what is in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen, 1986), the
finance manager has a non-autonomous right to influence dividend payment decision, although it
is possible to have a corporate manager whose self-motivated ambition usually capable of
significant cash retention for personal benefits rather than distribution to shareholders in the
form of dividend or maximizing their portfolio market value and wealth position is complementary
to one or more persons in the board structure, the consequence is usually fraud-related and most
especially, it creates asymmetrical behavioural relationship in the board committee leading to
infringement of stakeholders right and privileges and increased agency cost.
To mitigate the conflicting adventure between managers and stakeholders and protecting the
interest of the latter; hitherto, one possible way is to perfectly mix people of diverse characteristics,
backgrounds, and experiences to constitute the board, the proportion of female individuals been
equitably reasonable of the total population, this is believed to strengthen shareholders confidence
while eliminating economic bonding between managers and shareholders and influencing overall
decision relative to dividend payout.
Increased demand for corporate governance motivated researchers to examine the impact of
board gender diversity on organizational outcomes and various aspects of management such as
board’ supervision and monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003;
European Commission, 2012), reporting quality (Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015; Francis, Hasan,
Park, & Wu, 2015), firm performance (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Martín-Ugedo & Minguez-
Vera, 2014), and ea0rning management (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). All the aforementioned
strands of literature are relevant to substantiate this study with the view to close the seemingly
apparent gap in corporate governance. Prior studies have investigated how board’ various char-
acteristics such as board size (Abdelsalam, El-Masry, & Elsegini, 2008; Van Pelt, 2013), outside
directors (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Boumosleh & Cline, 2015), CEO duality (Officer, 2011;
Sawicki, 2009), age and experience (Custodio & Metzger, 2014) influence dividend policy.
However, there has been a shortage of literature on how gender diversity affects the determina-
tion of dividend payment amidst firms in Nigeria.
This study makes two contributions to the body of knowledge. It main contribution is to the
literature gender diversity and dividend payout policy in Nigeria. Secondly, we assessed firm’s
ability to pay a dividend based on their lifecycle. Existing research has examined empirical nexus of
dividend payment on gender diversity with specifically developed algorithms exposed to further
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intuitive enquiry and adaptive capacity. However, proxies used were limited to CEO duality, the
board size, firm age, firm size, etc. In Nigeria corporate environment, over the last decade, the
demand for good governance by investors, market regulators, employees, public and government
have set a new pace for progressive alliance strongly witnessed in internal coordination, efficient
resource utilization and transparent statutory disclosures in financial statement; the decisions
sequel to a democratically reinforced women mobilization and nomination at the AGM of firms in
Nigeria (Oladipo, Iyoha, Fakile, Asaleye, & Eluyela, 2019a). The central hypothesis of this research
concentrated on gender diversity and dividend payment; by examining the proportion of women
board member in the board composition and to what empirical extent the dividend payment
decision of selected firms is influenced by gender characterization. Our opinion revealed the
insignificant relationship between the two variables, and we further suggest that the board
composition of a firm should contain reasonable quota of women to ensure the right corporate
governance relative of dividend disbursement to shareholders.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows; section 2 reviews various literature on this
subject matter; section 3 discusses the methodology and model specification used in the study;
Section 4 presents the result and discussions of findings and section 5 shows concluding remarks
and recommendations.
2. Background
Gender diversity and the inclusion of more women in boards of directors and top executive manage-
ment positions have the potential to add value to organisations. For instance, gender diversity can
result in more social sensitivity when solving problems (Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, &
Malone, 2010) and increased diversity in thought and result in better company performance (Ernst
& Young, 2009). When board members include more gender diversity, a firm may increase its
chances of effectiveness due to better understanding their stakeholders’ needs, leading to better
risk management and general business practice. Decision-making would potentially be enhanced by
adding new ideas and perspectives to board and executive management meetings. Groysberg & Bell
(2013) found from a survey that 90% of female directors and 56% of male directors said that women
add fresh perspectives and thought diversity to boards of directors.
There are two theories of gender diversity in the workplace. They are agency theory and
Stakeholder theory (Eluyela et al., 2018b; Okere et.al, 2019; Uwuigbe, Eluyela, Uwuigbe, Obakpro,
& Falola, 2018). For this research, we will be focusing on the Stakeholder theory because the
agency theory has been over flocked in this area of study.
2.1. Stakeholder theory
A popular theory dealing with gender diversity in the workplace is the stakeholder theory, which
suggests that there are social benefits from placing women in senior positions (Cabrera-Fernandez,
Martinez-Jimenez, & Hernandez-Ortiz, 2016). Westphal & Milton (2000) emphasise that minority
groups, such as women and ethnic minorities, often bring unique perspectives that can be used to
enhance decision-making. Kramer, Konrad, and Erkut (2006) argue that when a company board
includes three or more women, governance is improved through taking into account the perspectives
of multiple stakeholders groups, including employees, customers and the community at large. The
presence of those womenwould also enhance decision-making by increasing the likelihood of dealing
with difficult issues rather than ignoring them (Kramer et al., 2006). Moreover, Abdullah, Ismail, and
Nachum (2016) argue that female directors are preferred by both large and small shareholders, as
they are likely to excel inmonitoring, an attribute preferred by both groups of shareholders. Nowadays,
companies face pressure from various stakeholders, such as institutional investors and the society to
appoint females on their boards (Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013). Norway has enacted laws to encourage the
presence of females in corporations, while the government of Quebec Canada adopted a resolution to
gradually increase to 50% the proportion of women sitting on the boards of state-owned firms (Audet,
2006; Francouer, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgange, 2008, p. 85).
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2.2. Comparative study of gender dichotomy on dividend payout policy
Several studies looked at the effects of appointment of females as bank directors or promoting them
to senior management positions. In their synthesis of studies on the roles of gender diversity in top
posts (such as boards of directors, audit committees, CEOs or CFOs), Khlif & Achek (2017) conclude that
female representation on such positions led to an increase in the conservativeness of financial
reporting and in the level of reporting on social and environmental issues and led to lower tax
aggressiveness. On the representation of females on top audit positions, Khlif & Achek (2017) con-
cluded that this led to higher audit fees, shorter report lag and a higher likelihood of an adverse audit
opinion being issued. Findings of several studies have suggested that femalemanagers aremore likely
to take less-risky approaches to business (Carter, Franco, & Gine, 2017). For example, Huang and
Kisgen (2013) found that female-led firms are less-risk-takers in that they are less likely to undertake
acquisitions or issue debt than male-led firms & Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2016) found that more
reliance on female CEOs leads to a reduction in corporate risk-taking, lower leverage and lower
volatility of earnings. Francis et al. (2015) found that female CFOs are associated with lower firm
risk, lower levels of dividend payout and more conservative financial reporting.
Empirical studies testify that state-owned firms of emerging markets are under increasing
pressure to include women in their boardrooms, primarily, to improve corporate governance
(Jonge, 2014). Literature about women in business leadership positions in Jordan is relatively
limited. Qasem and Abdullatif (2014) found some discrimination against women in accounting-
related positions in the Jordanian private sector due to characteristics of the Jordanian society and
the Jordanian workplace. Radwan, Abed Alaal, Kloub, and Wishah (2017) found similar discrimina-
tion against women in leadership positions in the Jordanian public sector. The study on Jordan
found that while women are represented to a small degree on top-level managerial positions,
gender diversity was found to be associated with better corporate governance implementation
and improved board effectiveness in decision-making. In the only study the researchers are aware
of that covered women in the banking sector in Jordan, Ahmad and Alshbiel (2016) found that
banks with female CEOs had inferior performance compared to those with male CEOs. However,
their study can be criticized for measuring the presence of women on executive managements by
using a dummy variable based on the CEO position being held by a female (only one Jordanian
bank currently has a female CEO) and measuring their presence on boards of directors by using
a dummy variable based on the existence of at least one woman on the board (boards of
Jordanian banks include different numbers of women). However, in this study, we proxied the
presence of women on boards by looking at the number of female directorship on the board
structure of sampled firms in Nigeria.
Djan, Zehou, and Bawuah (2017) examined the joint role of gender diversity and capital structure on
dividend policy of SMEs in Ghana. The study used 1,011 unlisted firms. The results show that the
appointment of females on the board does not significantly influence dividend policy. However,
dividend policy is influenced by capital structure of the firm. This findings confirmed with the results
of Saeed and Sameer (2017) where a comparative study of emerging economies examined. They used
a dataset of listed firms from three emerging economies which are: India, China, and Russia. The time
frame for their study was 2007–2014. Adopting Agency theory approach, they concluded that board
gender diversity is negatively related to dividend payout policy during financial crisis period.
3. Methods and materials
Our panel data comprising of 31 (out of 54) financial firms listed on Nigeria stock exchange
between 2010 to 2017; The sample size was purposively derived via applying Krejcie and Morgan
(1970) as cited in (Akintimehin et al., 2019; Otekunrin et al., 2018; Uwalomwa, Olamide, & Francis,
2015) who believe that 5% of a population is the minimum sample size expedient to make
inferences on the entire population. The sample period was selected based on the availability of
data. All data were sourced from annual reports of sampled firms. We selected the financial
services sector based on the current non-payment of dividends among these firms. To perform
the empirical analysis of this study, firstly, we presented the descriptive statistics result showing
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the measure of central tendency for all variables. Following this, the correlation statistics was used
to indicate the absence of multicollinearity among variables. Multicollinearity exists when any
variable is 80% correlated with another variable (Ozordi, Adetula, Eluyela, Aina, & Ogabi, 2019).
Furthermore, the Hausman test was presented to determine whether the panel regression
model fit the fixed or random effect (Eluyela et al., 2019). A fixed-effect model exists when the
probability level of the Hausman test is less than 5% (statistically significant). If otherwise,
a random-effect model exists. Finally, from the result of the Hausman test, we then presented
the random panel regression result. We adopted the panel regression model in this study because
the type of data gathered includes the properties of time series and cross-sectional data (Oladipo,
Iyoha, Fakile, Asaleye, & Eluyela, 2019b; Popoola, Asalaye, & Eluyela., 2018).
3.1. Model specification
Our baseline model specification was adopted from the work of Chen, Leung, and Goergen (2017)
with slight changes. In our model, we added board size, firm size and firm age as other variables
not considered in Chen’s study.
DPOTit ¼ β0 þ β1FDIRit þ β2BSIZEit þ β3FSIZEit þ β4FAGEit þ εit (2)
where the dependent variable, DPOT denotes the dividend payout measured by dividend per share,
FDIR represent female directorship measured by the percentage of female directors on the board,
BSIZE refers to the total number of directors on the board, FSIZE is firm size measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets. The control variable is FAGE which denotes firm age measured by
the number of years the company has been in existence. i and t represent industry fixed-effects
and year fixed-effects based on Fama and French classification (Chen et al., 2017).
4. Results and discussion
In this section, the result of the empirical analysis was presented. This analysis includes descriptive
statistics, correlation analysis, Hausman test and panel regression analysis.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data set. It aims at describing the nature and
features of the data set. The mean talks about the average value in each of the variables. The
variable with the highest mean is BSIZE at 10.82, which shows high performance in respect to
other variables. Subsequently, the FDIR standard deviation of 0.11 is the lowest standard deviation
when compared with other variables. This indicates that FDIR has a low fluctuation with respect to
other variables. The DPS shows that the average dividend per share of sampled firms is between
₦0 to ₦2.4 per share. Lastly, the average board size for the sampled firms is between 5 and 25. This
means that the board size of the sampled firms are appropriate for firm’s optimum performance as
evidenced by (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, Fadzil, & Al-Matari, 2012) who affirms that a firm with bigger
board size has the potential for better performance.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Test
FDIR BSIZE DPS FAGE FSIZE
Mean 0.296909 10.82051 0.315692 1.529430 9.743746
Median 0.300000 10.00000 0.200000 1.477121 10.05957
Maximum 0.600000 25.00000 2.400000 2.075547 12.54400
Minimum 0.000000 5.000000 0.000000 0.903090 6.300000
Std. Dev. 0.119896 3.541156 0.381893 0.229250 1.936627
Jarque-Bera 4.220061 21.23553 672.0186 1.936321 17.58290
Probability 0.121234 0.000024 0.000000 0.379781 0.000152
Observations 195 195 195 195 195
Source: Authors Computation (2019)
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Table 2 shows the relationship between the variables in the data set. Also, it was used to check
for multicollinearity in the data set and especially amongst the independent variables. Concerning
the benchmark of 80% as recommended by Eluyela et al. (2018a), it can be seen that there is an
absence of multicollinearity between the variables under study as the highest correlation is
between FSIZE and BSIZE with a relationship of 53%.
The Hausman test is usually carried out to determine which model best suits the panel regres-
sion. The rule states:
If the P-value is statistically significant, adopt a Fixed Effect Model
If the P-value is not statistically significant, choose a Random Effect Model.
As evidence in Table 3, the P-value (0.1133) >5% probability level and this implies that the
p-value is not statistically significant. Therefore, a random-effect model was applied for this
regression analysis.
Table 4 above captures the relationship between gender dichotomy (FDIR, FAGE, BSIZE & FSIZE)
and dividend payout policy (DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria. The analysis reveals an R-squared of
87% and an adjusted R-squared of 85%. This depicts that 85% of the variation in dividend payout
(DPS) is accounted for by the independent variables (FDIR, FAGE, BSIZE & FSIZE). The Durbin
Watson is 1.21 which falls within the acceptable limit of serial autocorrelation usually present in
time series data. The F-statistics have a value of 37.81231 with a P-value significant at 5% level.
The significance of the empirical model reveals that gender dichotomy (FDIR, FAGE, BSIZE & FSIZE)
has a significant effect on dividend payout policy (DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria.
4.1. The implication of findings
Examining the individual variables, it can be seen that gender dichotomy denoted by (FDIR) has
a positive (0.052121) and insignificant (0.1189) relationship with dividend payout policy (DPS) of
listed firms in Nigeria. This means that a unit change in gender dichotomy would bring about a 5%
increase in dividend payout (DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria. This finding conforms to the results of
Francis et al. (2015).
Table 2. Correlation Analysis
FDIR BSIZE DPS FAGE FSIZE
FDIR 1.000000 −0.767529 −0.194907 0.006421 −0.465073
BSIZE −0.767529 1.000000 0.273787 0.004566 0.531614
DPS −0.194907 0.273787 1.000000 −0.056088 0.419180
FAGE 0.006421 0.004566 −0.056088 1.000000 −0.108792
FSIZE −0.465073 0.531614 0.419180 −0.108792 1.000000
Source: Authors Computation (2019)
Table 3. Hausman Test
Correlated Random Effects—Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 7.463302 4 0.1133
Source: Authors Computation (2019)
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Furthermore, examining the control variables, it is revealed that Firm age (FAGE) has a positive
(0.621887) and significant (0.0006) relationship with dividend payout policy (DPS) of listed firms in
Nigeria. This depicts that a percentage change in the size of a firm would bring about a 62%
change in dividend payout (DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria. Also, Board Size (BSIZE) has a negative
(−0.015942) and significant (0.0109) relationship with dividend payout (DPS) of listed firms in
Nigeria. This means that a unit change in BSIZE would cause a 2% decrease in dividend payout
(DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria. Consequently, firm size (FSIZE) has a negative (−0.007313) and
insignificant (0.9221) relationship with dividend payout (DPS) of listed firms in Nigeria. This depicts
that a unit change in the size of a firm would bring about a 0.7% decrease in dividend payout (DPS)
of listed firms in Nigeria.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
In this paper, we examined the impact of gender diversity on dividend payout in Nigeria. Prior
literature on this issue is scant in developing countries like Nigeria. Our paper concludes that the
presence of female directorship does not significantly influence dividend payout in Nigeria. The
rate of dividend payout is highly determined by firm age and their performance. This is evidenced
in our panel data regression result. The implication of this is that new companies might not be
able to meet dividend payment to their shareholders due to their formative growth stage.
However, companies in their maturity lifecycle will be able to meet dividend payment. These
findings correlate with the work of (Saeed & Sameer, 2017). Our results are consistent with the
argument that board diversity enhances the monitoring and creates an atmosphere of discipline
for the benefit of the shareholders. But it is worth noting that policymakers in different countries
and sectors should not blindly adopt this initiative of gender diversity from another country, but
should carefully examine the causality in their context because of differences in national and
market policies.
Notwithstanding the essential results, our study is not without limitations. Firstly, we only
consider the financial service sector listed on the Nigeria stock exchange for the period 2010 to
2017. Secondly, some studies suggested the adoption of event studies approach to assess the
impact of director on financing decisions by comparing the pre and post-appointment period (Bel-
oms, 2015; Chen et al., 2017). However, due to the unavailability of data, we could not capture this
in work. Future researches can consider looking at other sectors listed on the Nigerian stock
exchange and look at the impact of event studies approach on the study.
Table 4. Random-Panel Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable: DPS
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2010 2017
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FDIR 0.052121 0.227255 0.229350 0.1189
FAGE 0.621887* 0.177247 3.508591 0.0006
BSIZE −0.015942* 0.006195 −2.573593 0.0109
FSIZE −0.007313 0.074652 −0.097966 0.9221
C −0.376203 0.645068 −0.583199 0.5606
R-squared 0.873688 F-statistic 37.81231
Adjusted R-squared 0.850582 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.214108
Source: Authors Computation (2019)
* show that variable is significant at 5% probability level
Eluyela et al., Cogent Business & Management (2019), 6: 1687270
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1687270
Page 7 of 10
Funding
This work was supported by the Landmark University
Centre for Research and Development [Nil];
Author details
Damilola Felix Eluyela1
E-mail: eluyela.damilola@lmu.edu.ng
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3080-6385
Olajide Dahunsi2
E-mail: jide_icon@yahoo.com
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3153-5705
Olawumi Ajoke Tolase3
E-mail: tolase.olawunmi@lmu.edu.ng
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6957-9298
Wisdom Okere4
E-mail: wisescar@yahoo.com
Mautin Ogabi2
E-mail: Ogabimautin@gmail.com
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8235-0204
Abiola Kafidipe2
E-mail: kafidipeabiola0806@gmail.com
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3486-5072
1 Department of Accounting and Finance, Landmark
University, Omu Aran, Nigeria.
2 Department of Accounting, Covenant University, Ota,
Nigeria.
3 Department of Banking and Finance, Covenant
University, Ota, Nigeria.
4 Department of Economics, Accounting and Finance, Bells
University of Technology, Abeokuta, Nigeria.
Citation information
Cite this article as: Impact of gender dichotomy on divi-
dend payout policy in listed Nigerian financial services
firm, Damilola Felix Eluyela, Olajide Dahunsi, Olawumi
Ajoke Tolase, Wisdom Okere, Mautin Ogabi & Abiola
Kafidipe, Cogent Business & Management (2019), 6:
1687270.
References
Abdelsalam, O., El-Masry, A., & Elsegini, S. (2008). Board
composition, ownership structure, and dividend poli-
cies in an emerging market: Further evidence from
CASE 50. Managerial Finance, 34(12), 953–964.
doi:10.1108/03074350810915879
Abdullah, S. N., Ismail, K. N. I. K., & Nachum, L. (2016). Does
having women on boards create value? The impact of
societal perceptions and corporate governance in
emerging markets. Strategic Management Journal, 37
(3), 466–476. doi:10.1002/smj.2016.37.issue-3
Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the board-
room and their impact on governance and
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94,
291–309. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007
Ahmad, M. A., & Alshbiel, S. E. (2016). Women in
Jordanian banks and performance: Financial
accounting measurement. Risk Governance and
Control: Financial Markets and Institutions, 6(3), 5–15.
Akintimehin, O. O., Eniola, A. A., Alabi, O. J., Eluyela, D. F.,
Okere, W., & Ozordi, E. (2019). Social capital and its
effect on business performance in the Nigeria infor-
mal sector. Heliyon, 5. doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2019.
e02024
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., Fadzil, F. H., & Al-Matari,
Y. A. (2012). The Impact of board characteristics on
firm performance: Evidence from nonfinancial listed
companies in Kuwaiti stock exchange. International
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(2),
310. doi:10.5296/ijafr.v2i2.2384
Al-Najjar, B., & Hussainey, K. (2009). The association
between dividend payout and outside directorships.
Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 10(1), 4–19.
doi:10.1108/09675420910963360
Audet, M. (2006). To modernise the public corporations’
governance. In Statement of Policy (pp. 33–40).
Bel-oms, I. (2015). Original article The board of directors
and dividend policy : The effect of gender diversity.
1977, 1–25. doi:10.1093/icc/dtv040
Boumosleh, A., & Cline, B. N. (2015). Outside director stock
options and dividend policy. Journal of Financial
Services Research, 47(3), 381–410. doi:10.1007/
s10693-013-0174-2
Cabrera-Fernandez, A. I., Martinez-Jimenez, R., &
Hernandez-Ortiz, M. J. (2016). Women’s participation
on boards of directors: A review of the literature.
International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship,
8(1), 69–89. doi:10.1108/IJGE-02-2015-0008
Campbell, K., & Minguez-Vera, A. (2008). Gender diversity
in the boardroom and firm financial performance.
Journal of Business Ethics, 83(3), 435–451.
doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9630-y
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003).
Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm
value. Financial Revision, 38, 33–53. doi:10.1111/
1540-6288.00034
Carter, M. E., Franco, F., & Gine, M. (2017). Executive
gender pays gaps: The roles of female risk aversion
and board representation. Contemporary Accounting
Research, 34(2), 1232–1264. doi:10.1111/1911-
3846.12286
Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Goergen, M. (2017). The impact of
board gender composition on dividend payouts.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 86–105.
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.001
Cumming, D. J., Leung, T. Y., & Rui, O. M. (2015). Gender
diversity and securities fraud. Academy of
Management Journal, 58(5), 1572–1593. doi:10.5465/
amj.2013.0750
Custodio, C., & Metzger, D. (2014). Financial expert CEOs:
CEO’s work experience and firm’s financial policies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 114(1), 125–154.
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.002
Djan, G. O., Zehou, S., & Bawuah, J. (2017). Board gender
diversity and dividend policy in SMEs: Moderating role
of capital structure in emerging market. Journal of
Research in Business, Economics and Management, 9
(2), 1667–1676.
Eluyela, D. F., Adetula, D. T., Obasaju, O. B., Ozordi, E.,
Akintimehin, O., & Popoola, O. (2019). Foreign direc-
tors, indigenous directors and dividend payout
structure in Nigerian deposit money banks. Banks
and Bank System, 14(2), 1–14. doi:10.21511/
bbs.14(2).2019.16
Eluyela, D. F., Akintimehin, O. O., Okere, W., Ozordi, E.,
Osuma, G. O., Ilogho, S. O., & Oladipo, O. A. (2018a).
Datasets for board meeting frequency and financial
performance of Nigerian deposit money banks. Data
in Brief, 19, 1852–1855. doi:10.1016/j.
dib.2018.06.044
Eluyela, D. F., Akintimehin, O. O., Ozordi, E., Oladipo, O. A.,
Ilogho, S. O., & Okere, W. (2018b). Board meeting
frequency and firm performance: Examining the
nexus in Nigerian deposit money banks. Heliyon, 4,
850. doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2018
Ernst & Young (2009). Groundbreakers: Using the strength
of women to rebuild the world economy. Retrieved
from http://www.womenable.com/content/userfiles/
E&Y-Groundbreakers.pdf
European Commission (2012). Impact assessment on
costs and benefits of improving the gender balance
in the boards of companies listed on stock
exchanges. Retrieved from SWD(2012) 348 final. ec.
Eluyela et al., Cogent Business & Management (2019), 6: 1687270
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1687270
Page 8 of 10
europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women on
boards/impact_assesment_quotas_en.pdf
Faccio, M., Marchica, M., & Mura, R. (2016). CEO gender,
corporate risk-taking and the efficiency of capital
allocation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 39, 193–209.
doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.02.008
Francis, B., Hasan, I., Park, J. C., & Wu, Q. (2015). Gender
differences in financial reporting decision-making:
Evidence from accounting conservatism.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 32(3),
1285–1318. doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12098
Francouer, C., Labelle, R., & Sinclair-Desgange, B. (2008).
Gender diversity in corporate governance and top
management. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1),
83–95. doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9482-5
Groysberg, B., & Bell, D. (2013). DysfunctGroysberg, B. &
Bell, D. (2013). Dysfunction in the boardroom,
Harvard Business Review, 91, 88–97.
Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. (2013). Gender and corporate
finance: Are male executives overconfident relative
to female executives? Journal of Financial Economics,
108(3), 822–839. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.12.005
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow corpo-
rate finance, and takeovers. American Economic
Review, 76(2), 323–329.
Jonge, A. (2014). The glass ceiling that refuses to break:
Women directors on the boards of listed firms in
China and India.Women Studies International Forum.
doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2014.01.008
Khlif, H., & Achek, I. (2017). Gender in accounting
research: a review. Managerial Auditing Journal, 32
(6), 627–655.
Kramer, V. W., Konrad, A. M., & Erkut, S. (2006). Critical
mass on corporate boards: Why three or more
women enhance governance. Wellesley Centers for
Women, Report No. WCW 11. Wellesley, MA.
Krejcie, R.V, & Morgan, D.W. (1970). Determining sample
size for research activities. Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 30,607-610.
Martín-Ugedo, J. F., & Minguez-Vera, A. (2014). Firm per-
formance and women on the board: Evidence from
Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises.
Feminist Economics, 20(3), 136–162. doi:10.1080/
13545701.2014.895404
Nekhili, M., & Gatfaoui, H. (2013). Are demographic attri-
butes and firm characteristics drivers of gender
diversity? Investigating women’s position on French
boards of directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 118(2),
227–249. doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1576-z
Officer, M. S. (2011). Overinvestment, corporate govern-
ance, and dividend initiations. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 17, 710–724. doi:10.1016/j.
jcorpfin.2010.06.004
Okere, W., Eluyela, D. F., Lawal, A. I., Ibidunni, O.,
Eseyin, O., Popoola, O., & Awe, T. (2019). Foreign
expatriates on board and financial performance:
A study of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The
Journal of Social Science Research, 5(2), 418–423.
doi:10.32861/jssr.52.418.423
Oladipo, O. A., Iyoha, O. F., Fakile, A. S., Asaleye, A. J., &
Eluyela, D. F. (2019a). Do government taxes have
implications on manufacturing sector output? evi-
dence from Nigeria. Journal of Management
Information and Decision Sciences, 22(3), 181–190.
Oladipo, O. A., Iyoha, O. F., Fakile, A. S., Asaleye, A. J., &
Eluyela, D. F. (2019b). Tax revenue and agricultural
performance: Evidence from Nigeria. Problems and
Perspectives in Management, 17(3), 342–349.
doi:10.21511/ppm.17(3).2019.27
Otekunrin, A. O., Nwanji, T. I., Agba, D. Z.,
Olowookere, J. K., Fakile, S. A., Ajayi, S. A., …
Oladiran, T. (2018). Outsourcing of accounting ser-
vices and strategic cost management method:
(A case study of Dangote flour PLC and Doyin
Investment Nig. LTD). Proceedings of the 32nd
International Business Information Management
Association Conference, Seville, Spain, IBIMA 2018,
8452–8465
Ozordi, E., Adetula, D. T., Eluyela, D. F., Aina, A., &
Ogabi, M. (2019). Corporate dynamism and cash
holding decision in listed manufacturing firms in
Nigeria. Problems and Perspectives in Management,
17(4), 1–12. doi:10.21511/ppm.17(4).2019.01
Popoola, O., Asalaye, A. J., & Eluyela., D. F. (2018).
Domestic revenue mobilization and Agricultural pro-
ductivity: Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Advanced
Research in Law and Economics, Volume IX, Summer,
4(34), 1439–1450. doi:10.14505/jarle.v9.4(34).31
Qasem, R., & Abdullatif, M. (2014). The status of women in
the accounting profession in Jordan: An exploratory
study. International Business Research, 7(8),
146–159. doi:10.5539/ibr.v7n8p146
Radwan, F., Abed Alaal, S., Kloub, M., & Wishah, R. (2017).
Jordanian women in leadership positions in the
public sector: Cultural barriers to their success.
International Business Management, 11(4), 874–884.
Saeed, A., & Sameer, M. (2017). Impact of board gender
diversity on dividend payments: Evidence from some
emerging economies. International Business Review,
26(6), 1100–1113. doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2017.04.005
Sawicki, J. (2009). Corporate governance and dividend
policy in Southeast Asia pre- and post-crisis. The
European Journal of Finance, 15(2), 211–230.
doi:10.1080/13518470802604440
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. (2011). Female directors
and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting
Research, 28(5), 1610–1644. doi:10.1111/
care.2011.28.issue-5
Uwalomwa, U., Olamide, O., & Francis, I. (2015). The
effects of corporate governance mechanisms on
firms dividend payout policy in Nigeria. Journal of
Accounting and Auditing, 2015, 1. doi:10.5171/
2015.313679
Uwuigbe, U., Eluyela, D. F., Uwuigbe, O. R., Obakpro, T., &
Falola, I. (2018). Corporate governance and quality of
financial statements: A study of listed Nigerian
banks. Banks and Bank System, 13(3), 12–23.
doi:10.21511/bbs.13(3).2018.02
Van Pelt, T. (2013). The effect of board characteristics on
dividend policy. Unpublished working paper. The
Netherlands: Tilburg School of Economics and
Management, Department of Finance, Tilburg
University, 1–62 [Unpublished].
Westphal, J. D, & Milton, L. P. (2000). How experience and
network ties affect the influence of demographic
minorities on corporate boards. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 45, 366 –398.
Woolley, A. W., Chabris, C. F., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N., &
Malone, T. W. (2010). Evidence for a collective
intelligence factor in the performance of human
groups. Science, 330, 686–688. doi:10.1126/
science.1193147
Eluyela et al., Cogent Business & Management (2019), 6: 1687270
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1687270
Page 9 of 10
©2019 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
You are free to:
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.
You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
No additional restrictions
Youmay not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Cogent Business & Management (ISSN: 2331-1975) is published by Cogent OA, part of Taylor & Francis Group.
Publishing with Cogent OA ensures:
• Immediate, universal access to your article on publication
• High visibility and discoverability via the Cogent OA website as well as Taylor & Francis Online
• Download and citation statistics for your article
• Rapid online publication
• Input from, and dialog with, expert editors and editorial boards
• Retention of full copyright of your article
• Guaranteed legacy preservation of your article
• Discounts and waivers for authors in developing regions
Submit your manuscript to a Cogent OA journal at www.CogentOA.com
Eluyela et al., Cogent Business & Management (2019), 6: 1687270
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1687270
Page 10 of 10
